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Why is there No Non-Western International Relations Theory?  
Ten Years On 
Amitav Acharya (American University) and Barry Buzan (LSE) 
 
Introduction  
 
A decade ago in 2007 we published a forum in International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific (IRAP) on ‘Why there is no non-Western IR theory?’. We focused 
that question on Asia, and assembled a group of authors to set out the state of 
IR in various countries and sub-regions across Asia. We posed it as a challenge 
to Asian IR scholars to get their voices and their histories into the global 
debates on how to think about IR, both for their sakes, and as a necessity for the 
balanced development of the discipline. This challenge attracted sufficient 
interest for us to follow it on with an expanded book version (Acharya and 
Buzan, 2010), bringing in more case chapters, including one looking at the 
Islamic world. 
 
In our framing chapters we took a wide and pluralist view of what counts as IR 
theory, and stressed the need to bring IR and Area Studies together. We looked 
at the reasons behind the global dominance of Western IR theory and Western 
‘world’ history, and at the possible resources for IR theory in the non-West. Our 
main arguments were:  
• The need for IR and IR theory to have a world historical framing rather than 
a Western historical one, and the need for the Non-West to both challenge 
the Western bias and get its own histories into play within IR. 
• The need to keep aware of the Coxian injunction that theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose, and to apply this to all IR theory. 
• The importance of history and political theory in IR theory, the massive 
Western bias in both, and the opportunities for the non-West to mobilise 
their own historical and philosophical resources. 
• That for several reasons, especially first mover advantage, the extensive 
training of non-Western IR scholars in the US, and Gramscian hegemony, 
Western IR theory was dominant in Asia. Although there were resources for 
theory in parts of Asia, there was not much indigenous IR theory there 
despite a quite widespread feeling that much of Western IRT did not fit well 
with either Asian history or contemporary Asian IR practices. 
• That the likely main movement in Asia was towards national schools of IR 
and that this offered both dangers and opportunities. Asian IR was not just 
playing catch-up with the West, but it was not regionally integrated either, 
and stood in some danger of fragmenting the discipline, both in Asia and 
globally. 
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There is no doubt that this work had an impact. According to the journal metrics 
of IRAP, as of June 2016, articles from the 2007 forum occupy five of the top 
ten places in the journal’s list of most-cited articles, including first and second. 
As of July 2016 Google Scholar recorded over 200 citations for the editors’ 
Introduction, and over 150 for the book. On this basis it seems justified to 
revisit this project ten-years on, and assess the current state of play. Much of 
what we said then about IR theory, the nature and reasons for Western 
dominance, and the resources available in Asia still stands. What we do in this 
article is first, to survey and assess the relevant literature that has come out 
since then; second, to set out four ways in which our own understanding of this 
issue has evolved since 2007; third to reflect on some ways in which Asian IR 
might contribute to the emergence of what we call ‘Global IR’; and fourth to 
look specifically at hierarchy as an issue on which particularly Northeast Asian 
history and political theory might offer a comparative advantage. Our aim is to 
renew, and perhaps refocus, the challenge to Asian IR scholars, and our hope is 
that this will contribute to the building of Global IR. 
 
Whither IR Theory? 
 
Before turning our attention to developments in IR theory in Asia, we set the 
context by briefly taking stock of the state of IR theory in general. Looking 
back at how IR theory has developed in the past decade, several trends stand 
out. First, the field’s mainstream, centered on the West, especially the US, 
appears to have moved past the “great debates” between paradigms (between 
realism and idealism, between classical and behaviouralist approaches, and 
between positivists and post-positivists), and “isms” (especially featuring 
Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism) (Jackson and Nexon, 2013: 545-48). 
The most recent debate, between rationalism (Realism and Liberalism) on the 
one hand and Constructivism on the other, has given way to attempts at 
paradigm bridging, theoretical pluralism and analytical eclecticism. (Dunne, 
Hansen and Wight, 2013).    
 
Second, the fading interest in the “big” or meta-theoretical debates has been 
accompanied by the growing popularity of “middle-range theories”. Such work 
identifies research questions or “issue-oriented puzzles” (Walt, 2005:33) in 
international affairs and explains them with the help of IR literature’s “widely 
accepted causal mechanisms” (Jackson and Nexon, 2013: 548), that specify the 
relationship between variables. The vast majority of work in major IR journals 
in the US fall into this category (Jackson and Nexon 2013: 548), though that is 
much less true of European IR journals, most of which maintain a broad 
spectrum of epistemological approaches. The rising IR journals in Asia (The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics has joined International Relations of 
the Asia-Pacific) also contain a broad spectrum of theoretical approaches. The 
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narrow positivist approach has been criticised for being constrained by 
prevailing “epistemological and ontological assumptions” (Dunne, Hansen and 
Wight, 2013), for producing mostly conditional or contingent generalizations 
(Walt, 2005:33), and focusing too much on “practically-relevant knowledge” 
(Reus-Smit, 2013), at the expense of theoretical innovation. Hence, the talk of 
“the end of international theory” (Dunne, Hansen and Wight, 2013).  
 
The rise of middle-range theory has mixed implications for those seeking to 
open IR theory up to the non-Western world. On the one hand. They have 
expanded the use of IR theory in general. They have stoked the curiosity of 
Western scholars in the wider world of regions and helped to engage the interest 
of non-Western scholars in IR theory. On the other hand, this type of work is 
also primarily, if not always, deductive. It is more concerned with testing the 
empirical validity of existing concepts than developing entirely new concepts 
and theories on the basis of new or previously neglected empirical data. The 
concepts and causal mechanisms it employs for its deductive reasoning are 
derived mainly from the Western history and experience. This entrenches the 
tradition of Western dominance in IR theory. 
 
A third development in IR theory during the past decade has been the further 
rise of Constructivism. In the 2014 Teaching, Research, and Policy (TRIP) 
Survey (2014), Constructivism came out the top choice of an IR paradigm 
22.5%, followed by Realism and Liberalism. (It should be noted, however, that 
the numbers of those who opted for “I do not use paradigm” exceeded 
Constructivism, attesting to the aforementioned point about the declining 
interest in paradigm debates).1 Alexander Wendt displaced Robert Keohane as 
“the scholar whose work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the 
past 20 years”.2  
 
The rise of Constructivism has some positive implications for those committed 
to the project of a more universal discipline of IR or Global IR. 
Constructivism’s emphasis on ideational forces compared to the material 
“powerlessness” of the developing countries (Puchala 2000:151) offers greater 
scope for capturing their normative role in world politics, such as in contesting 
and localizing Western norms and creating new ones to reform and strengthen 
world order.3 Second, Constructivism has made inroads into the study of 
regional dynamics by both Western and non-Western scholars (See for 
example, Barnett, 1995, 1998 on the Middle East; Kacowitz, 2005, and Sikkink, 
2014 on Latin America; Johnston, 1998, and Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002 on 
East Asia; and Acharya 2001, 2004, 2009, 2011 on Southeast Asia and Asian 
regionalism in general). The influential Constructivist book, Security 
Communities (Adler and Barnett 1998), largely focused on regions, both Europe 
and outside. All this literature has been invaluable in stimulating theory-guided 
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debates and analysis and communication among both Western and non-Western 
scholars.  
 
Third, with its emphasis on culture and identity, Constructivism has offered a 
valuable bridge between the area studies tradition that is popular in the IR 
literature in the non-Western world and the centres of IR in the West. As a 
Malaysian IR scholar (Karim 2007) writes, “Thinking in the constructivist vein 
has been about the best gift made available to scholars and leaders in the 
region.”  
 
Yet, Constructivism remains largely a Western-centric enterprise. While 
constructivism has moved beyond its initial privileging of Western norms and 
norm protagonists, it continues to neglect issues of race and pre-Westphalian 
civilizations in Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere that might bring new 
insights into IR theory from outside the core sourcing areas of the West. And a 
recent study analyzing an extensive journal-based data set (Bertucci, Hayes and 
James 2016), finds that “despite constructivism’s place as the leading 
theoretical alternative to rationalist approaches to the study of international 
relations, in terms of its substantive and empirical scope constructivism does 
not look much different than rationalist alternatives like realism and liberalism. 
In all cases, scholarship primarily focuses on security processes and outcomes 
taking place in the North Atlantic region and Europe”. They note that about 45 
percent of their sampled Constructivist research relates to the North Atlantic 
region, followed by 13.1 percent on Asia, whereas “regions such as Latin 
America, Africa and, most notably, the Middle East, have received only scant 
attention.” From the other side, the relationalist work in Northeast Asia (Qin, 
2011, 2016; Shih and Yin, 2013) seems to make only tenuous connections with 
work going on under the same label in the US. 
 
These above-mentioned trends in IR theory are not necessarily irreversible. 
Constructivism appears to be losing its shine in the post-theoretical turn in IR. 
Scholars are already looking for clues to a possible new great debate (Jackson 
and Nexon 2013: 554). But what cannot be overstressed is that not only the so-
called great debates, but what comes after them, including the literature inspired 
by mid-range theories and Constructivism, have been a remarkably parochial 
affair. They have made little effort to engage IR scholarship from the Global 
South, and almost no attempt to recognize, not to mention explain or bemoan, 
the almost total marginalization of the Global South from the mainstream IR 
theories. It is as if the Global South scholarship on IR, and the developments in 
IR during and after the great debates, exist in parallel universes.   
 
This leads to a fourth trend in the IR theory in the past decade; the persistence 
of American and Western dominance. Here we see a serious disconnect 
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between Western scholars and those from the Global South. The increasing 
recognition of American and Western dominance in the West is one thing, it is 
quite another for that recognition to actually reshape the intellectual agenda of 
Western scholars (with the notable exception of the new English School). This 
is underscored by the inclusion of a lonesome article (Tickner, 2013), one out of 
12 essays in a 2013 special issue of the European Journal of International 
Relations, (Wight, Hansen and Dunne, 2013) devoted to discussing of 
“pluralism” in IR theory. Surely any discussion of a “pluralist turn” in IR theory 
in a journal known for avoiding the dominance of American scholarship in IR - 
which is often cited as the chief source of IR’s exclusionary stance towards 
Global South voices and agency - could have been more concerned with the 
question whether theory continues to be parochial and ethnocentric or universal 
and inclusive of the majority of people living on this planet. By contrast, Dunne 
and Reus-Smit, 2017, adopt a broader approach, taking into account the 
conversations on Global IR taking place during and after the 2014 International 
Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention. 
 
In marked contrast to the West, scholars from the Global South, and their 
collaborators and likeminded scholars from the West, have become increasingly 
vocal in highlighting the persisting parochialism of the mainstream IR 
scholarship (Some examples, far from exhaustive, would include: Acharya, 
2011, 2014; Acharya and Buzan, 2007, 2010 Agathangelou and Ling, 2009; 
Behera 2010; Bilgin, 2008, 2013; Chowdhry and Nair, 2004; Ling, 2002, 2010; 
Neuman, 1998; Shilliam 2010; Smith, 2006; Tickner, 2003; Tickner and 
Waever, 2009; Tickner and Blaney, 2012; Thomas and Wilkin, 2004). The 
election of Amitav Acharya in 2014 as the first non-Western President of the 
ISA hopefully made some breakthrough for their cause. His Presidential theme, 
“Global International Relations and Regional Worlds”, which was the basis of 
ISA’s 2015 Convention, served as a focal point for highlighting the American 
and Western dominance of IR. Acharya’s use of “Global IR” rather than Non-
Western IR theory, was intended to address some of the concerns raised against 
the latter including from scholars working on Global South issues. Almost a 
quarter of the total number of panels and roundtables at the New Orleans 
Convention, were devoted to the Convention theme. Tellingly, just before the 
Convention, the 2014 TRIP Survey found that a clear majority of its 
respondents believe that IR is both American dominated and Western 
dominated. When asked if IR is an American-dominated discipline, 49% agree 
and 11% strongly agreed, for a total of 60%. When asked if IR is a Western-
dominated discipline, the result was that 53% agreed, and 22% strongly agreed. 
Thus an overwhelming 75% of the total number of respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed that IR is a Western-dominated discipline (For details, see 
Wemheuer-Vogelaar, et. Al. 2016).4 And for the first time, at the same New 
Orleans Convention, a scholar from outside the West (China), Shiping Tang, 
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won the ISA’s best book prize (on a shared basis), for his theoretical work, The 
Social Evolution of International Politics (Tang, 2013). 
 
Whether this is a turning point or a passing phase remains to be seen. At the 
very least, there seems to be a growing awareness cutting across the West-Rest 
divide that IR theory needs to be more reflective of the Global South and take 
the direction of Global IR (Eun, 2016; Dunne and Reus-Smit, 2017). Yet there 
is always a traditionalist resistance to change. Objections range from the 
adequacy of the existing IR theories to explain developments in the non-
Western world, such as Asia, because, despite its distinctive features, the latter 
has been progressively integrated into the modern Europe-derived international 
system and adopted its behavioral norms and attributes (Ikenberry and 
Mastanduno, 2003: 412-23); to the more dismissive claim that there is nothing 
wrong with the American dominance of the field because it is “benign” 
(Mearsheimer 2016).  
 
In sum, there have been a few useful developments towards a more global IR 
over the past decade. Awareness worldwide of the discipline’s West-centrism is 
more widespread than before. World class IR journals are getting established in 
Northeast Asia. Some green shoots of original IR theorising are appearing, 
especially in China. But the basic picture of a parochial US still dominating IR 
theory remains in place. Perhaps the best that can be said is that whether it is 
recognised in the US or not, the global challenge to the epistemologically 
narrow and self-referential American way in IR is getting stronger. As in the 
real world, the legitimacy of American hegemony is in sharp decline even while 
its material power remains dominant. Interestingly, Asia’s rising IR theory is 
like Europe’s in often standing outside the American mainstream, and keeping 
open a wider range of theoretical approaches. 
 
Building a Global International Relations   
 
The two of us are inescapably part of the process we describe. In the decade 
since we first conceptualised the IRAP forum, we have not only received a lot 
of feedback from it, but also become increasingly dissatisfied with the ongoing 
West-centrism of IR just described. During that time, our work and thinking 
have moved in mainly separate, but nonetheless strikingly parallel tracks. Both 
of us have been committed to developing global and world historical 
perspectives on IR, and both have acquired a deepened awareness and 
understanding of the problem of West-centrism in IR (Acharya, 2014a; Buzan, 
2011; Buzan and Lawson, 2014a & b, 2015). In that latter context, both of us 
have come to appreciate some of the insights of postcolonialism, though not 
necessarily accepting all of its political baggage. It may help readers to 
understand what has stimulated and motivated our growing interest in 
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promoting a more global IR, if they know how our thinking got to where it is 
now, and therefore why we thought it useful to revisit the theme of the 2007 
IRAP forum. In this section we therefore highlight four developments in our 
own thinking that have shaped how we now understand the issues around 
developing ‘non-Western’ IR theory. These are: uneven and combined 
development, the relationship between theory and history, the English School’s 
understanding of international society, and the need for ‘global IR’. 
 
Applying uneven and combined development to IR as a discipline 
 
Acharya (2004, 2009) has long been interested in how norms spread 
internationally, and has argued that local cultural dispositions shape not only 
what outside norms are locally acceptable or not, but also how outside norms 
get shaped and adapted to local ideas and practices. More recently, Buzan’s 
thinking has been influenced by the work of Justin Rosenberg (2010, 2013, 
2016) on uneven and combined development (UCD) as a way of theorizing ‘the 
international’, which reinforces Acharya’s line.  
 
Rosenberg (2016) argues that there is always a multiplicity of societies 
interacting with each other. He understands unevenness to be a basic fact of 
historical development driven by three variables: first, the diversity of 
geographical endowments; second, the physical separation of political units; 
and third, the differential impact of ‘combination’. ‘Combination’ means the 
ways in which social orders trade, coerce, emulate, borrow and steal from each 
other, and is intrinsic to any international order. Before the 19th century, degrees 
of combination varied mainly with geography, which facilitated deep 
connections in some environments (most notably where there were available 
sea and river routes), but obstructed it in others (particularly in the case of land 
barriers). By contrast, degrees of combination since the 19th century have been 
heavily determined by industrial technologies. Under the impact of steamships, 
railways, highways, aircraft, spacecraft and electronic means of communication 
from the telegraph to the internet, the importance of geography falls away, and 
combination intensifies rapidly, and probably permanently (Buzan and Lawson, 
2015). Combination therefore increases directly with development. 
Combination is both a homogenizing and a differentiating force.  
 
UCD stands as an alternative to Waltz’s (1979: 76) formulation of 
homogenization into ‘like units’ through ‘socialization and competition’. Both 
Waltz and Rosenberg see socialization and competition as consequences of 
combination. But they disagree about their effects, with Waltz favouring 
homogenization into ‘like units’, and Rosenberg stressing that the particular 
timing and circumstances of socialization and competition produce varied 
outcomes. The extreme conditions created by macro-historical transformations 
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such as the one that took place during the long 19th century expose the logic of 
the latter with great clarity (Buzan and Lawson, 2015). Major transformations 
of this kind have a distinct point or points of origin in which a particular 
configuration emerges and is sustained. This configuration is produced and 
reproduced through inter-societal interactions. Further changes spread outwards 
from this leading-edge (or edges). The pace of spread varied according to the 
mediating effects of social and physical environments. Agriculture, for 
example, was slow to spread to less productive soils and climates, and some 
modes of social order were more receptive to it than others. If unevenness was – 
and is – a basic fact of historical development, then different peoples and places 
encounter macro-transformative pressures at different times and under different 
circumstances, and with different outcomes.  
 
Each social order that encounters the new configuration has its own way of 
adapting to it. The encounter may be coercive or imitative. Some social orders 
resist the new configuration, either because of internal resistance to the changes 
it requires (e.g. Qing China), or because of attempts by leading-edge polities to 
maintain inequalities between them by denying access to elements of the 
transformation (e.g. much of the colonial world). Others succeed in developing 
indigenous versions of the new configuration (most strikingly Meiji Japan). 
‘Late’ developers, for example, are not carbon copies of the original adopters, 
but develop their own distinctive characteristics: thus the growing literature on 
‘varieties of capitalism’ (Buzan and Lawson, 2014a). In this sense, the 
interactions between different social orders produce not convergence, but (often 
unstable) amalgams of new and old. Through the analytic of UCD, it becomes 
clear that development is both global and local, multilinear rather than linear, 
proceeds in fits and starts rather than through smooth gradations, and contains 
many variations in terms of outcomes.  
 
The synergy between Acharya’s thinking and UCD should now be obvious. Just 
as with development, so the spread of IR thinking will also be uneven and 
combined, and the expectation should not be Waltzian uniformity, but 
Rosenbergian diversity. Western dominance is the external pressure, but as 
Acharya argues, local circumstances shape whether and how these ideas are 
taken into local usage. We should expect a globalising IR to be both combined 
and diverse, and welcome that as a creative process that gives real agency to the 
‘late developers’ of IR theory. 
 
Rethinking the relationship between theory and history  
 
In our Introduction to the book (2010: 4, but not to the 2007 Forum) we drew a 
rather stark distinction between history and social theory, seeing them as 
‘opposites’: ‘Where historians seek to explain each set of events in its own 
 
 
9 
 
9 
terms, social theorists look for more general explanations/understandings 
applicable to many cases distributed across space and time’. A differentiation 
between theory and history along these lines remains quite common (e.g. Elman 
and Elman eds., 2001). For most social sciences, including IR, theory (as 
intellectual systems) and history (as events, experiences and practices) appear 
as distinct domains. These domains are differentiated by an elemental division 
of labor between theory-building social scientists and (putatively) chronicling 
historians (Lawson, 2012). Although we acknowledged that this was an 
oversimplification, it now seems not only wrong, but unhelpful to the enterprise 
of Global IR that we wish to encourage. Our argument is that the development 
of a properly global IR requires bringing its theory and world history together in 
a more systematic and open way.  
 
Our view now is that:  
 
the relationship between history and theory is better conceived as co-
constitutive. Understanding theory, and understanding history, requires 
inquiry attuned to the entwinement of theory and history. Theory is not 
something ‘out there,’ removed from history, even retrospectively. Rather, 
theories are assessed and reassessed, made and remade through ongoing 
encounters with history…. theories arise historically, formed amid the 
encounters between theorists and the events they experience and, sometimes, 
take part in: Marx the revolutionary, Clausewitz the soldier, Freud the 
analyst. In this understanding, theory is a living archive of events and 
experiences. We say ‘living’ because theories are not only derived in and 
from history understood as ‘the past’, they are also recrafted as they 
encounter new histories. In other words, theories are assessed and 
reassessed, made and remade through ongoing encounters with history. 
Theory is made in history, and it simultaneously helps to make history.5  
 
That theory and history are inextricably entangled has long been evident in the 
roots of realist and liberal theory in European/Western history. The issue is not 
to deny this link, but to acknowledge it and then move on to build a global IR 
theory on the foundations of world and not just Western history. 
 
Rethinking the English School’s understanding of international society  
 
There has for a long time been a strand of dissatisfaction with the classical 
English School’s Eurocentric account of how the present global international 
society (GIS) came about top-down as a result of the expansion of what was 
originally a European regional international society (Buzan and Little, 2014). 
While by no means wholly wrong, that account significantly understated both 
the coercive element, and the interplay between Europe and the rest of the 
 
 
10 
 
10 
world, in the making of GIS. It denied agency to ‘the rest’, treated the non-West 
as something of a blank slate, and contributed to the misleading embedding of 
Western history as being world history.6  
 
Both within and alongside the English School, there is now a growing body of 
recent work aimed at correcting this imbalance by locating the story of GIS 
more firmly in world history. Among others, Kacowicz (2005), Schulz (2014), 
Suzuki et al. (2014), Phillips and Sharman (2015), and Pella (2014, 2015) have 
made substantial contributions towards filling in the stories of the pre-existing 
international societies into which the Europeans expanded. They show that from 
the 16th to the 18th centuries, while the Europeans had a significant military 
superiority in sea power, in much of Asia they were militarily weak on land, 
and had few trading advantages other than access to American silver. Not until 
the 19th century did the small modernizing core of Western states have a 
generalised military, economic and political superiority over what rapidly 
became the global periphery. Before that, the Europeans encountered others on 
equal or even inferior terms, and these encounters fed into the processes of the 
making of global modernity. In one sense Europe did impose its form of politics 
(the sovereign, territorial, nation-state) and international relations (Westphalian 
international society) onto the rest of the world. But as it was doing so, its own 
processes of development were being shaped by encounters with the rest. The 
contemporary GIS should not be viewed only as a formation of Waltzian ‘like 
units’ sharing a thin veneer of primary and secondary institutions. It needs also 
to be seen as differentiated along several cross-cutting lines: by type of state, by 
geography (regions), by hierarchy (core-periphery, great powers, race, gender, 
etc.) and up to a point functionally (economic, legal, political etc.) (Buzan and 
Schouenborg, forthcoming).  
 
By rebalancing the story of how the global international society was made, and 
taking a more differentiated view of how contemporary GIS is structured in the 
light of that historical legacy, the English School has strengthened its position 
of as part of the necessary foundations for developing a more global IR theory.  
 
Shifting from a focus on the ‘Non-West’ to Global IR 
 
Thinking about GIS in this more integrated and balanced way, brings us back to 
the idea of Global IR. If contemporary GIS is indeed a product of world 
historical dynamics, and not just Western ones, then IR also needs to become 
more global in both its historical and theoretical sources. The label “non-
Western IR theory which we coined in 2007 generated interest beyond our 
expectations. It served a crucial purpose in generating debate that drew a good 
deal of attention to the parochialism of IR. One of the criticisms, which we had 
taken into consideration in the 2007 IRAP special issue, but has since become 
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even more salient, is that globalization and income convergence make the 
categories West and non-West, and the distinction between core and periphery, 
less and less meaningful, especially in an era of rising powers such as China 
and India. These distinctions still have some utility. The term West remains 
politically useful to both the rising powers in defining their identity and the 
Western nations (in dealing not only with non-Europeans, but also, as seen in 
the Ukraine crisis, with Russia and Eastern European societies). What IR now 
needs is a single global conversation about the state of IR theory and of the 
discipline. 
 
This thinking undergirded the idea of Global IR, (Acharya 2014a). The idea of 
Global IR is an extension of our notion of non-Western IR, but goes beyond it 
for both normative and instrumental reasons. The project of making IR 
inclusive cannot be a conversation among the likeminded. And it is more likely 
to fail if it does not draw in the broadest group of scholars, including those in 
the Western mainstream. In this context, the idea of a “post-Western IR”, with a 
“more radical agenda to disavow and displace” the existing knowledge of 
Western IR, is highly problematic. The problem is how to both invent a global 
IR and still engage with those schooled in the existing IR traditions in a 
meaningful two-way dialogue? (Acharya 2011). Labels matter. Global IR does 
not reject the terms “non-Western” or “post-Western”, but views them “as part 
of a broader challenge of reimagining IR as a global discipline” (Acharya 
2014a).  
… the main elements of the Global IR approach are: a commitment to 
pluralistic universalism (one that does not impose any particular idea or 
approach on others, but respects diversity while seeking common 
ground), grounding in world history, theoretical pluralism, a close nexus 
with the study of regions, regionalisms and area studies, avoidance of 
cultural exceptionalism, and recognition of multiple forms of agency, 
including the agency of non-Western actors (Acharya 2016). 
 
Global IR is not a theory, but a way of understanding and reshaping the 
discipline of IR. It does not seek to displace existing Western-dominated IR 
knowledge. Unlike some critical theories and postcolonial scholarship, Global 
IR does not reject the mainstream theories, such as Realism, Liberalism, the 
English School and Constructivism, but challenges their parochialism and urges 
them to accept the ideas, experiences and insights from the non-Western world. 
All paradigms and isms have their place in Global IR. But this is not pluralism 
as understood in recent writings on IR theory (for a survey of the literature on 
pluralism, see: Dunne, Hansen and Wight, 2013, Eun, 2016). Pluralism in 
Global IR does not mean relativism, or accepting a variety of theories to co-
exist or seeking unity or synthesis among theories or pursuing “analytic 
eclecticism”. Nor is it what Dunne, Hansen and Wight (2013: 416) call 
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“integrative pluralism” that “accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range 
of theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of 
providing more comprehensive and multi-dimensional accounts of complex 
phenomena”.  Pluralism in Global IR does not accept and preserve existing 
theories as is, but expects them to give due recognition to the places, roles, and 
contributions of non-Western peoples and societies. In this sense, Global IR is 
really more about pluralization within theories, rather than just between them. 
IR is still largely rooted in Western history and political theory. Although it has 
pretensions to be about all times and all places, in fact it is a rather parochial 
expression of the short period in world history when the West was dominant. 
The discipline would look very different if it had been invented in China, India 
or the Islamic world. As the period of Western dominance begins to ebb, Global 
IR needs now to break away from this parochial bias by incorporating 
perspectives not only from other histories and political theories, but also from 
world history. It is time for IR to live up to its name.  
 
How Asia Fits into Global IR  
 
What are the implications of Global IR for the study of IR in Asia? It is useful 
here to examine some recent developments in theoretical work on Asian IR. But 
in doing so, we urge that what and who is Asian should be defined broadly. One 
should take into consideration not only writings by Asian scholars based in 
Asia, but also the contribution of anyone writing theoretically on the 
international relations of Asia. We also take a broader view of IR theory 
(Acharya and Buzan, 2007, 2010; Alagappa, 2011) and what constitutes 
theoretical advances than Johnston (2012) who is skeptical of the value of 
theoretical work on Asia. His standard for judging this is whether it can 
“resolve major controversies, lead to breakthroughs, and drive theory 
development”. To some extent, this is an unfair question because the 
controversies and debates that Asia is expected to resolve in order to meet 
Johnston’s standard originated in Western contexts with limited relevance for 
Asia. Applying Western IR concepts and theories is only a first, very small, step 
towards breaking the Western parochialism of IR as a discipline. More 
important is to expand the histories and cultural resources on which IR theory 
generally is based. This might lead to both local theories (like those about the 
EU) or to reconfigurations of existing mainstream ones (like the developments 
in the English School described above). Our interest in non-Western IR theory 
emerged over a growing dissatisfaction with the applicability of mainstream IR 
theories to Asia. But its real contribution was to encourage explorations into 
alternative sources of IR theory, such as indigenous histories, classical 
philosophy and religious traditions, the ideas of national leaders, the writings of 
contemporary scholars, and the foreign policy practices of modern states and 
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the norms and process dynamics of regional interactions (such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations).  
 
With this in mind, we can make a number of ‘ten-years on’ observations about 
the development of theoretical work on Asian IR. First, overall interest in 
theory seems to be growing among the academic community studying Asian IR. 
This is encouraging news for Global IR, which is contingent on the greater 
engagement of scholars outside the West in IR theory - not only theoretical 
approaches to the study of world politics at large but also to the study of the 
international relations of their respective nations and regions. There is no 
systematic survey to confirm this. We can only say this from anecdotal 
evidence, including our attendance at conferences held in Asia and outside, the 
participation by Asian scholars in international conferences such as those 
organized by the International Studies Association (ISA), and the World 
International Studies Conference (WISC), and the growing number of 
conferences organized by such associations in Asia (In 2015, for example, ISA 
held its first ever regional Convention in Southeast Asia). 
 
Some of the reasons for a rising interest in theory may have to do with changes 
in the conditions that we had identified as impediments to the development of 
IR theory in Asia (Acharya and Buzan, 2007). These included the paucity of 
resources, shortage of publishing outlets, language barriers, official frowning on 
theoretical work, and relatedly, the pull of policy relevant work that offers 
greater prestige and financial rewards to IR scholars in many parts of Asia. 
Some of these barriers remain, especially the entrapment of IR scholars in 
policy research. But there have been improvements in other areas. Asian 
universities are increasingly well-endowed. There has been a marked shift in 
this regard in China. In India, there have emerged a number of private and 
public universities, such as the multilaterally-sponsored South Asia University 
and the privately endowed O.P. Jindal Global University. These have added to 
the resource base of the Indian IR community. The theoretical turn in Asian IR 
is also due to the role of Asian IR focused journals, such as The Pacific Review 
(published from UK and celebrating its 30th anniversary in 2017), International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific (based in Japan and launched in 2000), and the 
newer Chinese Journal of International Politics (Based at Tsinghua university 
and launched in 2006). The oldest IR journal in Asia, International Studies, 
published since 1959 by the oldest IR School in Asia, has also shown a growing 
interest in IR theory.7 
 
Our second observation about theoretical work on Asia is that its most 
important contribution has been to challenge existing IR theories, especially 
their applicability to Asia. Two examples from the literature on regional 
security in Asia make this point, although one can also find examples of such 
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challenges in the study of the political economy of the region (especially those 
concerning the challenge posed by Asia’s state-led capitalism to neoclassical 
theories of international development). One of the two challenges is to 
realist/neorealist predictions that the end of the Cold War would produce a 
breakdown of order in Asia due to multipolarity, the rise of new powers, and 
the relative absence of mitigating factors such as strong regional institutions or 
economic interdependence (Kang, 2003, Acharya 2004). This may yet turn out 
to be a false optimism, especially in view of recent growth of maritime tensions 
in Asia, but the nearly three decades that have elapsed since predictions about 
Asia’s multipolar instability were first voiced is a long enough a period to 
justify skepticism about theoretical suppositions derived from Europe’s past 
that multipolar orders are inherently unstable. A better explanation might be the 
drift towards ‘hypermasculine’ regimes and foreign policy behaviours in 
Northeast Asia (Sjoberg, 2012). 
 
Another area in which theoretical writings on Asian IR have challenged the 
Western theoretical mainstream concerns West European-derived theories of 
regional institutions, especially the rationalistic, interest-driven, formal, 
legalistic and bureaucratic approach epitomized by the European Union. 
Writings on Asian regionalism have highlighted the relevance of more informal, 
consensual and process-centric approaches to regional cooperation. Thanks to 
theoretical work on Asian regionalism, there has been a growing acceptance in 
the wider IR community, well before Brexit happened, that the EU should not 
be considered to be to be a universal model for judging the performance of 
regional institutions elsewhere.  
 
Aside from these two examples, on which much evidence already exists, Asia is 
also shaping to be a crucial area for challenging the Liberal view that the 
emerging powers of the world can be coopted into the American-made and -led 
world order, and by implication the system of global governance it has 
promoted and defended since World War II. According to this view, the 
emerging powers have benefitted so much from the American-led order that 
they would have little reason to seek its replacement. With China, India and 
Indonesia, Asia could really be crucial to assessing whether the Liberal claims 
proves valid. China’s initiatives in developing parallel institutions such as the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and its and India’s participation 
in the BRICS’-organized development and financial organizations, suggest not 
outright co-option, but a demand for reform and reorientation of the existing 
international order (Stuenkel, 2016).  
 
Our third observation is that theoretical work on Asia is seldom at the 
metatheoretical level or taking on the “great debates” frontally. There have been 
notable exceptions, such as Tang’s (2013) “Social Evolution Paradigm” (SEP), 
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which argues that no single theory is valid across all time, and that IR theories, 
especially realism and liberalism, “are appropriate to different phases of 
history” (see the discussion of “theoretical pluralism” by Eun 2016). Most 
theoretical work on Asian IR has involved middle-range theories, such as those 
related to balance of power, interdependence, institutions, or norm diffusion, 
thus reflecting, as mentioned earlier, the general trend in IRT in recent years. 
Some of the best examples of such work can be found in the Stanford 
University Press’ series, Studies in Asian Security. There has also been a 
proliferation of specialized book series on Asian IR from other publishing 
houses, including Routledge (which has several imprints on Asian IR and 
security), Palgrave Macmillan, Edward Elgar, Sage, Georgetown, Columbia, 
etc.   
 
It is our general impression that works by Asian scholars using middle-range 
theory tend to be contextually grounded and leans more towards inductive, 
rather than deductive approaches (Acharya, 2009). Despite the aforementioned 
limitations, work employing middle-range theories and empirically grounded in 
Asia, can lead to the refinement of paradigms and debates within as well as 
between them. They can produce new theoretical concepts and explanations 
with broader cross-regional and global applicability, such as Shih’s (1990; Shih 
and Yin, 2013) and Qin’s (2011, 2016), concept of “relationality”. Qin, a key 
promoter of the Chinese School, claims that his “relational theory of world 
politics”, not only resonates within Chinese culture deeply but also has a 
universal relevance. Western actors also behave relationally, even though this 
may be hidden from view because of the emphasis on rationality in Western 
culture. Qin’s relationality argument echoes Constructivism, but this is 
consistent with a core element of Global IR that it does not displaces existing 
IR theories but seeks to enrich them with the infusion of ideas and practices 
from the non-Western world. We argued in 2007 that theoretical work on Asia 
(or any region) should not simply apply Western theories in the local context to 
assess their validity, but should generalize from the local context on its own 
terms to offer new concepts and approaches that have analytical value beyond 
the region. This is an important requirement of Global IR that Asia is beginning 
to address, although it has a long way to go. 
 
Our fourth observation is that although still limited, there is also some 
indication of growing attempts by scholars drawing on classical traditions and 
civilizations to challenge Western IRT and propose alternative or indigenous 
concepts and theories (See Chong, Milner, 2016; Yan, 2011, 2013; Shahi and 
Ascione, 2016). This approach is an important step towards a Global IR. It has 
been foundational for the aspirations for a Chinese School, and could 
potentially contribute to the theory development, if not a ‘school’ in India. 
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Fifth, we note that developments in Asian IR during the past decade vindicate 
our conclusion in 2007 that an “Asian school of IR” of region-wide scope was 
highly unlikely.8 Obstacles to a regional school include the distinctive local 
conditions and intellectual predispositions, often shaped by national ideologies 
and foreign policy frameworks, of scholars in the various parts of the region, 
especially Japan, China and India (Alagappa 2011). Institutional support 
mechanisms for the study of IR also vary widely among Asian countries. To be 
sure, these differences should not be overstated and may be blurring now, with 
some shared themes emerging across sub-regions such as the role of rising 
powers in the existing international order, economic interdependence, and 
regional institutions. But another constraint on the development of an Asian 
School of IR is the rather limited nature of exchange and interaction among 
scholars from the different subregions of Asia. One limited exception here is the 
Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), founded in 
2003, and the regional conferences organized by the International Studies 
Association (ISA) in various Asian locations, including Japan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore.  
 
Sixth, in 2007 we had also argued that “schools” that reflect distinctive national 
themes, trajectories and foreign policy approaches are more likely to emerge in 
Asia. Since then, a “Chinese school of IR” has been much mooted, though what 
in fact has emerged are several different approaches drawing on various aspects 
of Chinese history, culture and political theory (Wang and Buzan, 2014). There 
is some talk of Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese IR schools, but not yet much 
of substance to back them up. It is perhaps a good bet that as in China, and 
indeed as for the English School, any national schools that do emerge will 
simply operate alongside an array of different theoretical approaches. In India, 
as in China, there is a growing interest among scholars to draw upon classical 
Indian texts such as the epic Mahabharata (Narlikar and Narlikar, 2014; Datta-
Ray 2015) and the secular treatise Arthasastra (Gautam, 2015) traditions to 
explain Indian foreign policy and strategic choices. This raises the possibility 
that Indian scholars might one day develop such a school by focusing on the 
rise of India, including the distinctive concerns and status that comes with it. 
But such talk is yet to grow into a self-conscious attempt to develop an Indian 
School of IR (Acharya, 2013).  
 
While the development of national schools can contribute to the goal of a 
Global IR, there are also risks and limitations, some of which are especially 
visible in authoritarian states, where proximity to and identification with the 
centers of national power and security, including state and regime security, is a 
significant pressure. Politics aside, our key concern about any national school is 
whether it can “deprovincialize” (Acharya 2014c), i.e., travel beyond the 
national or regional context from which it is derived in the first place, as the 
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English School and the Copenhagen School (“securitization” theory) have done. 
If “schools” are only useful for explaining developments with regard to a 
specific country or region, then their proliferation carries a greater risk of the 
fragmentation of the discipline This is indeed a major challenge from 
developing a Global IR from local thinking and sources.  
 
Conclusion: Hierarchical Traditions and Models 
 
The challenge for Asian IR is how to contribute to the building of Global IR. 
Asian exceptionalism, or generalizing from the unique attributes of Asian 
history, culture and identity, while valuable, will not suffice. One needs to look 
at alternative and multiple pathways to bring Asia in and enrich IR theory with 
ideas, concepts and theories that have meaning and applicability beyond Asia or 
its individual countries. This idea of "deprovincializing" Asia (Acharya 2014c), 
and building a pathway towards a “pluralistic univeralism” (Acharya, 2014a) in 
IR theory out of Asia is, in our view, the central intellectual challenge facing 
Asian scholars of IR. Building IR theories that cover specific times and places 
is certainly part of what needs to be done. There are many historical gaps in the 
coverage of IR theory, and it is just as legitimate to theorise about the Chinese 
tribute system as it is to theorise about the EU. But the larger goal should be to 
make conceptual and theoretical contributions that reach beyond local times and 
places. 
 
We conclude by looking more closely at one specific example of the kind of 
theorizing from Asia that might have wider application: the hierarchical 
traditions and models of Confucian Northeast Asia. There may well be other 
hierarchical traditions from Asia that can be used in this way. As Neumann 
(2011) notes, most of those who entered Western international society came 
from suzerain systems of one sort or another. But the Confucian case is at this 
point the best developed and most widely known. When we wrote in 2007 it 
was still reasonable to see China and Japan as exceptions to the realist rules of 
statehood (290). China was still attempting to rise peacefully, and Japan was 
still mainly content with being a trading state with major constraints on its right 
to use force. Now both look, in realist terms, more ‘normal’. China has spent 
the last few years increasing its military strength, being increasingly assertive 
towards its neighbours, and throwing its newly acquired weight around. Japan 
has turned towards re-acquiring the characteristics of a ‘normal’ state. Both are 
ruled by nationalist-minded parties, and their relationship has deteriorated over 
the festering history problems between them. In some ways, this matters to 
what we said above about national schools of IR and the role of Asia in making 
global IR. It perhaps matters less to what we have to say about hierarchy and 
relationalism as possible Asian contributions to IR theory, though it does put 
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them into sharper relief as factors shaping the contemporary practice of 
international relations in Asia. 
 
We have argued that if IR had developed elsewhere than in the West it would 
almost certainly not look like it does now. This argument is based on the close 
linking between IR theory and the anarchic practices and political theories that 
have dominated Western international history. East Asia provides the clearest 
historical counterfactual, because its international history has been mainly 
dominated by hierarchical practices and political theories. There is no shortage 
of observers of East Asian societies and international relations who think that 
hierarchy remains a powerful factor in all levels of political relations in these 
societies (Shih, 1990; Fei, 1992; Harris, 2014: locs. 362-74, 1289; Chen, 2015). 
Confucianism is widely held to provide the philosophical foundations for 
hierarchical thinking and practice in East Asia, and to the extent that this 
observation is correct, East Asia’s history and political theory point to hierarchy 
as one key area in which this region can mobilise its intellectual resources to 
make a distinctive contribution to IR theory. Mainstream Western IR theory has 
for long been subject to the critiques of anarchophilia and Eurocentrism, and is 
increasingly open to the need to think about hegemony and hierarchy as 
essential elements of the international system/society (Watson,1992; Simpson, 
2004; Lake, 2009; Clark, 2011; Zarakol, 2011; Bukovansky et al., 2012). Waltz 
(1979) was not wrong in his argument that hierarchy is a fundamentally 
different principle of social order from anarchy/sovereign equality. Among 
other things, hierarchical structures, with their focus on relative status, generate 
quite different logics of securitization from anarchical ones, with their focus on 
the absolute status of sovereign equality. 
 
The basic Confucian model of society is rooted in a hierarchical family 
structure similar to that in many traditional agrarian civilizations (Hwang, 2011: 
109-10, 199). For traditional Chinese ‘foreign policy’ (not a wholly appropriate 
term) during the Ming dynasty, it was about a benevolent and morally superior 
emperor expecting loyal subordination from others, and reserving the right to 
punish them if they disturbed China’s peace or good order (Zhang, F, 2015: 
202-5). This model can be, and is, extended to the political and international 
realms, as it was under the principle of Tianxia which applied Confucian 
relational logic to ‘all under heaven’. There is support in the literature for the 
view that this still applies in modern foreign policy terms, with Confucian 
cultures being more inclined to hierarchy and bandwagoning than to sovereign 
equality and balance of power (Fairbank, 1968; Kang, 2003-4; Kissinger, 2011: 
1-3; Harris, 2014: locs. 362-74. For a critique, see Acharya, 2003-4).  
 
Traditionally in East Asia, Confucianism operated mainly on the basis of a 
hierarchy rooted in the existence of a central culture. Power considerations were 
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of course relevant to establishing and maintaining hierarchical relations, but 
they were not its main foundation (Zhang, Y. 2001; Suzuki, 2009: 34-55; Zhang 
and Buzan, 2012; Zhang, F, 2009, 2014). After 1911, the Chinese imperial 
system was abandoned. By then Japan was already strongly in contention for 
the mantle of ‘Middle Kingdom’, having defeated China in 1895 and Russia in 
1905. Japan’s attempt at regional empire lasted until 1945, and since then, the 
US has had hegemonic status in East Asia (Goh, 2013). China’s rise now puts 
the question of hierarchy back onto the agenda for NEA. China has no strong 
claim to either political or cultural centrality or superiority, so any claim for 
hierarchy will be based mainly on its relative power and wealth. The current 
neo-Confucian discourse from the Chinese party/state about a harmonious 
society, both domestically and internationally, and about Tianxia as a 
structuring concept for international relations, suggests that China is reclaiming 
these traditions to legitimize its foreign policy. As Callahan (2009) notes, this 
linkage gives a worryingly imperial/hierarchical implication to China’s 
discourse about harmony. This certainly fits both with China’s keenness to deny 
equal status to Japan, and its undiplomatic assertions in Southeast Asia about 
big versus small countries. In Confucian thinking, social harmony necessarily 
rests on the precondition of stable hierarchy. But almost nothing is said about 
the hierarchy side of this equation in China’s contemporary foreign policy 
rhetoric. At least in China, therefore, political sensitivity might constrain the 
development of IR theory along these lines. But that inconvenience does not 
disguise the fact that East Asia commands the historical and philosophical 
resources to address an IR theory issue on which Western theorizing has been 
relatively thin. The fact that China is promoting hierarchical rhetoric at the 
same time as it also plays as one of the strongest defenders of sovereign 
equality and non-intervention, makes this topic not just theoretically important, 
but also of immediate policy interest within Asia and beyond. 
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1 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) Survey (2014), Available at 
https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/questions/38 . Constructivism is of course a broad church, so this 
figure embraces people taking quite different approaches, but nonetheless agreeing to 
identify with the general label. 
2 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) Survey (2014), Available at 
https://trip.wm.edu/charts/#/bargraph/38/5045).  
3 On the normative agency of the Global South, see: Global Governance (2014) 20:3 with 
contributions by Eric Helleiner (international development), Kathryn Sikkink (human rights), 
Martha Finnemore and Michelle Jurovitch (universal participation), and this author 
(normative impact of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung on human rights, 
sovereignty, disarmament, and the UN). See also the essays in Weiss & Roy, eds. 2016. “The 
UN and the Global South, 1945 and 2015: past as prelude?” Special Issue of Third World 
Quarterly, 37 (7). 
4 The 2014 TRIP Survey split the sample so that respondents either received the question 
with American dominance (and later countering this dominance) or Western dominance. The 
term “Western” triggered significantly more agreement in terms of dominance than the term 
“American” Further details can be found in the TRIP Article in the Issue. 
5 For the full argument behind this paragraph, see Buzan and Lawson (forthcoming). 
6 By GIS we mean the society of states that includes all of the states-members of the 
international system. This distinguishes from both regional international societies, such as 
that in Europe or the Middle East, and subglobal ones, such as Western. 
7 See “International Studies in India”, Special Issue of International Studies, 46 (2009) 1 & 2. 
8 Indeed, given the theoretical diversity in Chinese IR, there will not even be a single 
‘Chinese School’ (Wang and Buzan, 2014). 
